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On the ontological status of Nouns (Are 
nouns ontologically neutral?)  
Richard Carter (2008) 
 
It is often assumed, and something similar has 
been assumed for thousands of years, that the 
most basic kind of noun (N) is one that denotes 
a basic level category of objects, that the most 
typical Ns are Ns like "cat", "chair", "tree", 
"stone", and that other kinds of nouns have less 
basic meanings, in some sense. The problem is, 
in what sense? 
If we take this as written, then even nouns like 
"water", which denotes a kind of substance, 
"toy", which presumably denotes a much 
broader category of objects, including dolls, toy 
cars, guns, etc. each of which has its own basic 
level term, and its own recognition criteria, or 
"thing", which presumably denotes a very 
general category, not at all a basic level 
category (BLC), "brother", which denotes a 
person in a particular kinship relation to another 
person, "mamma", which denotes a specific 
individual, or, more generally, another kinship 
relation, "Johnny", are less basic, less typical. 
And nouns like "jump", which denotes an 
action, "game", which denotes a kind of activity, 
"noise", which denotes, say, a kind of event, 
and, in fact, thousands of nouns of English, 
including "category", "essence", "country", 
"street", and many others, are atypical nouns. 
This raises certain problems. 
 
For one thing, most, perhaps all, of the world's 
languages have nouns corresponding to all these 
subtypes, and, in fact, it is tempting to say that 
anything that can be denoted by any kind of 
word can be denoted by a noun, in some 
language, or even in most languages. 
Furthermore, in most languages the class of 
nouns is the largest: for instance, there are tens 
of thousands of nouns in English, and, I would 
guess, far fewer verbs (less than ten thousand?) 
even fewer adjectives, and so on. 
 
In fact, it is not clear that there are any HL 
(human languages) at all where noun is a closed 
class, although there are some, a minority 
perhaps (Farsi, Kalam, Kobon, etc.) where verbs 
are a closed class, and a perhaps larger number 
(Bambara, Japanese?, where adjectives are a 
closed class). If we restrict our search to 
formally simple nouns (f.i. "book", but not 
"handbook" or "armchair") there are still, in 
most languages, many thousands, but there may 
be a few languages (Navajo?) where there is just 
a small, rather closed class: most nouns in 
Navajo, I think, are derived, mainly from verbs. 
Interestingly, where nouns, or even formally 
simple nouns, number in the thousands, many of 
these are like the purportedly atypical nouns 
mentioned above: they denote entities of other 
classes than objects, such as classes of 
substances ("juice", "snow"), actions 
("walk","punch") events ("storm", "hurricane") 
places ("lake", "country", "city", "planet", 
"spot", "place") kinship or other relations 
("cousin", "friend", "enemy", "foe"), mental 
events or states ("idea", "love", "shock") entities 
of other, perhaps dubious, ontological types 
("shadow", "trace", "god", "spell", "gap", 
"hole"). 
 
Among the empirical questions that seem 
relevant to improving our understanding of the 
ontological status of nouns, are the following: 
Are there any O-types (ontological types) that 
are not lexicalized as nouns, in some, or all 
languages? 
Are there any O-types lexicalized as nouns, such 
that the nouns of these O-types are learned, and 
always, or usually, produced, before others? 
Note that if even one of the event nouns of 
English (say "game", or "storm") is frequently 
learned/uttered as one of the first hundred 
nouns,  that could raise problems both for the 
claim that the O-type event is cognitively 
harder, or less natural, or comes later, or 
perhaps even is less important, for a young 
child, than, say the O-type thing. And if it was 
observed that event nouns, or action nouns, in 
all languages that have them, are acquired later 
than event verbs, and in particular verbs 
expressing the same  event or action, that would 
provide some support for the claim that these O-
types are more naturally expressed as verbs than 
as nouns (modulo other possible explanations, 
such as different frequencies of the nouns and 
verbs in child directed speech)    
 
 
The issue of language-dependent 
conceptualization 
 
It is conceivable that there are both conceptual 
and lexical constraints at work. For instance, it 
may be that certain concepts are more strongly, 
or more complexly, language-dependent (LD) 
than others. Thus, abstract concepts like 
"relation", "ontology", and other culturally 
specific, often explicitly taught concepts like 
"synonym", "benediction", "luck", 
"subtraction", "percentage", "solstice", and 
thousands of others, should come later, if they 
require a lot of basic language, and cultural 
knowledge, to be grasped, and even more so if 
they require cognitive maturation of other kinds, 
say of the representational resources (RRs) for 
which the prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role. 
It may also be the case that certain concepts 
require much more perceptual experience than 
others (as presumably even a non-LD version of 
OAK would be acquired only by sufficient 
exposure to oaks, and a non-LD version of 
CANINE -assuming such a concept is possible 
without language- might require particular kinds 
of experience of various kinds of canines, say 
dogs, foxes, wolves, and experience of non-
canine mammals, such as squirrels, cats, rabbits, 
for the child to notice the visual and behavioral 
characteristics that the canines have in common 
and that distinguish them from the non-canines, 
and for these to become salient enough for the 
child to create the concept CANINE). 
Presumably such harder concepts cannot be 
among the first for which words are learned, but 
that calls for corroboration. 
 
 An alternative to the other biases:  
 
Among the biases people have considered are 
the following: 
(i) a pure noun bias (cf. Gentner, but see below): 
on this view, the language learner (LL) prefers 
to use nouns rather than any other lexical class 
(LC), in a pure form, this seems to predict 
(wrongly) that the O-type of the N would not 
matter, it would depend on what nouns LL has 
heard; 
(ii) a concrete object bias: on such a view, at the 
one word stage, at least, LL prefers to talk about 
or refer to, concrete objects, and it so happens, 
for other reasons, that in all HLs these can be 
lexicalized only as nouns. This could be taken to 
predict that the LL would never be able to make 
predications, without language, or, at least, that 
at the start of the multi-word stage LL's lexicon 
of Ns would be much larger than his/her lexicon 
of other L-types, and should consist mainly of 
nouns for concrete objects, depending on how 
strong the bias is, but, if this theory is made 
more precise, by including a specific prediction 
about the strength of the bias, say that 75% of 
the vocabulary learned at the single word stage 
consists of concrete nouns, that should also 
predict what utterances should look like at the 
onset of the multi-word stage, say there should 
be a much smaller set of verbs or predicate 
words of any type (assuming no V or A can 
denote concrete objects) than of nouns;  
(iii) a concrete noun bias (this seems closest to 
Gentner's early proposal): on this view, there is 
a bias both at the conceptual level, say for the 
O-type concrete object (say at the BL), and at 
the LC level, for the class of nouns 
  
I suggest the following alternative: 
(iv) at the prelinguistic stage, there is a strong 
bias for concrete conceptualizations (perhaps, 
even, on a particular instantiation of this idea, 
for conceptualizations corresponding to 
predications, or thoughts, such as one that 
would be expressed by a concrete noun plus a 
concrete predicate). For this proposal to be 
made more falsifiable, we need to spell out what 
the set of concrete conceptualizations includes 
(for instance, a desire to be picked up by 
mother, but not a desire for mother to write a 
computer program, or even to count to ten or set 
back the clock, since those concepts are 
unavailable to the infant), and LL "looks for", 
hence learns, lexemes that concern, are heard in, 
preferred situations, whether they are N, V, or 
prepositions. Thus the infant might acquire 
rapidly a lexeme such as, for picking up, a word 
like "kuch" (meaning carry on back, in Tzotzil) 
or a preposition or particle meaning something 
like "up", or a verb meaning "pick", or a N 
meaning "back" or "arm", depending on the 
language and the CDS (child-directed speech).  
The prediction should be that, if more nouns are 
heard in such situations than verbs or adjectives 
(which may be a subset of the total nouns the 
caregiver uses in the child's presence) then more 
nouns will be learned, if not, not. 
 
The claim need not be that the LL is only 
capable of "complete" or proposition-like 
thoughts, (what we might call 
"propositionoids") say predicate + argument 
conceptualizations (as is sometimes proposed, 
along with the idea that these are unanalyzed, 
"holistic", units), it could be proposed that LL 
has multiple O-types available, including 
concrete object, substance, people, action, state, 
direction  concepts, and is able to learn lexemes 
for each type, but that LL is not able to 
represent only a concrete object in isolation, or 
only an action: perhaps LL can only have a 
representation combining an object concept with 
a predicate concept.  
Another variant, perhaps more plausible, would 
propose that LL can have a conceptualization 
focused exclusively on an object, say mommy, 
or a toy, and can also have a conceptualization 
of the predicative type (object + action/state, 
such as mommy laughing, or toy broken), but is 
not able to have a purely predicative 
conceptualization, or even a concept of an 
action, in isolation. This would imply, 
presumably, that, in the single-word stage, when 
LL utters a noun alone, it can either express an 
object conceptualization, or a complex 
predicate+argument conceptualization (thus 
"toy" could either be a speech event of naming 
something as a toy, or a request for a toy, 
equivalent to "I want a toy" or "bring a toy", or 
"that's a/my toy"), while if LL utters a verb or 
adjective alone, it can only express a 
predication, such as "bring" for "bring me that 
toy", or "broken" for "the toy is broken". It 
would be incumbent on the researcher to 
determine criteria for deciding what kind of 
utterance LL has produced, presumably based 
on contextual plausibility. 
 
One minor problem with this propositionoid 
proposal is reminiscent of that raised by Quine: 
it is not particularly plausible, if LL can focus 
on an object like a chair or dog, that it cannot 
also focus on water flowing from a faucet, or 
snow, or mud, or other substances. To respond 
to this worry, the original proposal can be 
modified, for instance to the claim that LL can 
represent not just propositionoids, but also 
"concrete" entities of other sorts than objects, 
such as substances, and perhaps noises, smells, 
etc. After all, among the sentences one can 
express in all HLs are sentences like "there is 
snow", "there is water", and every language 
allows utterances like "water!", or "aha, snow", 
"a noise!". 
It's not clear how different "snow is falling" 
which, on one common account, combines the 
"concepts" SNOW and FALL, really is from 
"aha, snow!", which combines the concept 
SNOW with an expression of surprise. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how to determine 
whether the infant can have two distinct 
concepts, say one for snow the substance, one 
for the event of snow falling, and whether, even 
if the infant has both "concepts", when the 
infant sees snow falling, it can have either one 
or the other concept. The crucial point about 
most verbal and adjectival concepts is that they 
do not really make sense alone, except 
intentionally: there can't be falling without 
something that falls, whiteness without 
something that is white. Thus even if a mind 
could have a distinct concept for the event of 
falling, it would presumably have access to the 
fact that falling implies the existence of a faller, 
whether or not it is currently representing the 
faller along with the falling, or not.  
This dependence is observable with all nouns 
that express actions, states, events, etc. Thus, the 
"full" sentence: 
There is falling. 
entails that there is something, whether 
substance or object, that is falling. Likewise 
There is whiteness. 
entails that there is something that is white, an 
object or substance, not a noise or event. And 
There was an accident. 
entails the existence of concrete entities like 
objects, substances, etc. (Can an accident 
involve just a noise, and no entity producing the 
noise?) 
If it is true that LL can represent in isolation 
only entities like stones, water, and perhaps 
noises, smells, say entities that are directly 
perceptible, but cannot represent accidents, 
falling, moving, whiteness, without concurrently 
representing what it is that is falling, white, or 
involved in an accident (footnote: it is of course 
debatable whether an infant can have a concept 
as complex as ACCIDENT) that would be 
something more than a "bias": it would be a 
limitation on what the content of a 
representation can be.  
There can be little doubt that an infant, a 
chimpanzee, or even an adult human without 
language, has limitations on what it can 
represent, compared to a normal, language-
equipped older human. The real questions are: 
what is the nature of these limitations?, and how 
much does enculturation, and language, add to 
our representational, or conceptual, capacities? 
Is, in fact, the capacity to represent an event or 
state without representing the entity involved a 
conceptual ability that requires language? 
 
